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I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the cornerstone
of the United Nations efforts in the field of international development
cooperation and operates as the central funding and catalytic mechanism of the
United Nations development system. From its origins in the Expanded
Programme of Technical Assistance and Special Fund to the present, UNDP has
continually adapted itself to the changing needs of programme countries and the
evolving nature of international development.
Developing cooperation in the 60s and early 70s was largely perceived as
technical assistance: the transfer of skills, technology and knowledge from the
advanced and rich countries to the poor countries of the third world. In keeping
with the times, UNDP used Specialized Agencies,' such as FAO and UNESCO,
* Mr. Ssekandi is currently the General Counsel of the African Development Bank in Abidjan,
Cote d'voire and former Deputy Director of the General Legal Division of the Office of Legal Affairs. Ms.
Johnson is an Associate Legal Officer in the General Legal Division, Office of Legal Affairs, at the United
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1. Organizations brought into relationship with the United Nations under Article 63 of the Charter.
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largely staffed by people from developed countries to provide technical
assistance.
It is widely accepted today that a more cooperative approach to the
provision of development assistance is necessary,2 one where there is
partnership among people and active participation by those in the programme
country in the design and implementation of development programmes and
projects.3 In UNDP, the main instrument to convey this approach to the
provision of development assistance is known as national execution.
This paper documents UNDP's transition from the traditional model of
providing development assistance referred to above, which used Specialized
Agencies as UNDP's technical and managerial agents, known as the tripartite
relationship among UNDP, the Specialized Agencies and programme country
governments, or agency execution, to national execution, where governments
assume overall responsibility for such management.
In order to understand UNDP and the significance of this transition,
Section One describes UNDP's origins in the Expanded Programme of
Technical Assistance and the Special Fund as well as the subsequent merger of
these two programmes to form UNDP. Section Two traces the
institutionalization of national execution in UNDP as the norm for the provision
of development assistance. Finally, Section Three gives an overview of the
promises and challenges of national execution.
H1. SECTION ONE
A. The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
The Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance was approved by the
General Assembly in its resolution 304 (IV) of 16 November 1949, on
recommendation of the Economic and Social Council, with the primary
objective of helping under-developed countries to "strengthen their national
economies through the development of their industries and agriculture, with a
view to promoting their economic and political independence in the spirit of the
Charter of the United Nations, and to ensure the attainment of higher levels of
economic and social welfare for their entire populations."4 It was the first
attempt by the United Nations to provide technical assistance on a large scale.'
An analysis of the principles on which the Expanded Programme was based and
2. THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD 189 (1995).
3. Id. at 191-92.
4. See Economic DevelopmentofUnderdeveloped Countries, G.A. Res. No. 222 (IX), ECOSOC,
at 14, 15 and Annex 1 I 1 (Avg. 1949).
5. MAHNAR NASHAT, NATIONAL INrEREsTs AND BUREAUCRACY VERSUS DEVELOPMENT AiD 1
(1978).
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the manner in which it functioned can help to understand UNDP today - and
the significance of the shift to national execution.
The origins of the Expanded Programme can be traced to an earlier
General Assembly resolution, resolution 200 (I), of 4 December 1948, in
which the General Assembly considered that "the promotion of conditions of
economic and social progress and development [was] one of the principal
objectives of the Charter of the United Nations" and that the lack of "expert
personnel" and "technical organization" were among the factors impeding the
economic development of underdeveloped countries.6 The General Assembly
considered further that the United Nations could extend "efficacious and timely
help" and requested the Secretary-General to arrange the following:
a. international teams of experts to advise Governments on their
economic development programmes;
b. facilities for the training of experts from under-developed
countries through fellowships for study;
c. facilities for the training of local technicians within the under-
developed countries themselves; and
d. facilities to assist Governments obtain technical personnel,
equipment and supplies.7
The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report at each
session on measures taken to implement the resolution and to formulate
recommendations.8
In resolution 180 (VIII) of 4 March 1949, ECOSOC requested the
Secretary-General, taking into account, inter alia, General Assembly resolution
200 (1) and the Secretary-General' s first report in response thereto,9 to prepare
a report in consultation with the executive heads of the interested specialized
agencies setting forth:
1. A comprehensive plan for an expanded cooperative programme
of technical assistance for economic development through the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, paying due attention to questions
of a social nature which directly condition economic development;
2. Methods of financing such a programme including special
budgets; and
6. TechnicalAssistanceforEconomic Development, G.A. Res. 200 (l), U.N. GAOR, l12(a)-2(b)
(1948).
7. Id. 71 2, 3 (a)-(d).
8. Id. 6.
9. Creation of a Central Publication for the Promotion of and Advising Development Projects,
U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1083/Add. (1949).
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3. Ways of coordinating the planning and execution of the
programme.1
0
In response to ECOSOC's request, the Secretary-General consulted with the
executive heads of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the International Refugee Organization (IRO); input was also
received from a number of Member Governments and the Organization of
American States." The Secretary-General's Report in response to ECOSOC
resolution 180 provided an overview of the objectives and nature of the
programme, the fields of work, forms of technical assistance, organization,
finance, and included detailed proposals by the above-referenced organizations,
except the IMF and IRO which prepared statements instead along with the
International Trade Organization (ITO).
In June 1949, the Secretary-General proposed that "ECOSOC give
consideration to the expansion of the scope of the technical assistance
programme."'" Notably, the Secretary-General proposed comprehensive
missions, advisory services by experts, training, seminars and publications, for
a total increase in the 1950 budget for such activities to United States $676,000
from United States $307,750 appropriated for such purposes in 1949."
The Secretary-General's March and June 1949 Reports provided the basis
for ECOSOC Resolution 222 (IX), which set out the Observations and Guiding
Principles of the Expanded Programme.
The Observations and Guiding Principles of the Expanded Programme
contained in Annex I of ECOSOC resolution 222 (IX) were recommended by
ECOSOC to serve as guides to the United Nations and the specialized agencies
participating in the Expanded Programme (hereinafter collectively
"Participating Organizations") and addressed the following areas: General
Principles,' 4 Standards of Work and Personnel, Participation of Requesting
10. TechnicalAssistanceforEconomic Development, G.A. Res. No. 180 (VIII), ECOSOC, at pmbl.
and f 1-3 (Mar. 1949).
11. U.N. SGR to ECOSOC, El1327/Add. 1, at vii, viii (1949).
12. Addendum to Second Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, U.N. DOC.
E/I 335/Add.I, at 2 (1949).
13. it at 5 1 (f).
14. The general principles for the provision of technical assistance, taken from General Assembly
resolution 200 (Ell), are as follows:
(a) Technical assistance for economic development of under-developed countries
shall be rendered by the participating organizations only in agreement with the
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Governments, 5 Coordination of Effort, Concentration and Economy, and
Selection of Projects.
ECOSOC resolution 222 (IX) also set out the administrative and governing
structure for the Expanded Programme. The Programme was governed by both
a Technical Assistance Board (TAB) and a Technical Assistance Committee
(TAC), both of which were to be guided by the Observations and Guiding
Principles of the Expanded Programme. 6
The TAB consisted of the executive heads of the Participating
Organizations chaired by the Secretary-General or his representative, and
included the United Nations, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, and WHO.' 7 The
TAB provided a forum through which the Participating Organizations could
come together and share information on new requests for assistance and
ongoing activities. Each Participating Organization was required to present
annual reports to the TAB on its proposed programme for the next year and the
TAB was to make recommendations concerning the proposals and the overall
programme to ECOSOC through the TAC. The Secretary-General was
authorized to designate the Executive Secretary of the TAB, in consultation
with the Participating Organizations, whose responsibility was to service the
TAB.18
Governments concerned and on the basis of requests received from them;
(b) The kinds of services to be rendered to each country shall be decided by the
Government concerned;
(c) The countries desiring assistance should perform, in advance, as much of the work
as possible in order to define the nature and scope of the problem involved;
(d) The technical assistance furnished shall:
(e) Not be a means of foreign economic and political interference in the internal
affairs of the country concerned and not be accompanied by any considerations of a
political nature;
(i) Be given only to or through Governments;
(ii) Be designed to meet the needs of the country concerned; and
(iii) Be provided as far as possible in the form which that country desires
Technical Assistance for Economic Development, G.A. Res. No. 222 (IX), ECOSOC, 9th Sess., Agenda Item
9, at Annex L (fl 1-3, U.N. Doc. E/1335/Add.l (1949).
15. Governments were to facilitate the activities requested from the Participating Organizations;
and undertake sustained efforts required for economic development, including "progressive assumption of
financial responsibility for the administration of projects initiated at their request under international
auspices." Id. at Annex 1 1, 5.
16. Id. at 7 7.
17. Although not Participating Organizations, the IRBD, IMF, and IRO regularly attended and
participated in the meetings of the TAB and pledged the fullest cooperation for the promotion of the
objectives of the Programme. Report of the TAB, E/1742, at J 7 (July 4, 1950). In addition, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) became Participating
Organizations on August 30,1951 by ECOSOC resolution 400 (XIII), and the International Atomic Energy
Association (IAEA) on October 23, 1958, by ECOSOC resolution 704 (XXVI) of the same date.
18. Id. at 5 9 3-4.
44 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 7:39
The TAC was proposed as a standing committee of ECOSOC, consisting
of the members of ECOSOC. The terms of reference for the TAC were as
follows: to critically examine activities undertaken by the Programme and the
results achieved; to examine each year's programme; to interpret ECOSOC re-
solution 222 (IX) in the event of conflicts; to receive reports from the TAB; and
to review the working relationships between the Participating Organizations.' 9
At the first meeting of the TAB, a draft basic Agreement was prepared to
be used in negotiating with the recipient countries regarding the provision of the
technical assistance. The Agreement was based on the Observations and
Guiding Principles contained in ECOSOC resolution 222 (IX), Annex I, and the
experience of a number of international organizations.' The agreement set out
the basic terms and conditions under which the Participating Agencies would
provide technical assistance to the recipient countries and addressed issues
relating to the type of assistance to be provided, administrative and financial
arrangements and the privileges and immunities to be accorded to the
Participating Agencies and their personnel.2 The clauses in this early
agreement are similar to those still being used today in UNDP's standard basic
assistance agreement (SBAA).22
As has been shown, the Expanded Programme was truly a joint initiative
of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. The Specialized Agencies
were deeply involved in establishing the principles upon which technical
assistance would be provided to Governments under the Expanded Programme.
From the earliest efforts of the United Nations in the field of development
cooperation, the Specialized Agencies assumed the role of providing and
managing such assistance.
B. The Special Fund
The Special Fund was established following a number of years of study by
special committees of the General Assembly and ECOSOC on ways of
enhancing urgent assistance to developing countries, as complementary to the
work already done by the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the
Expanded Programme. The purpose was to "advance the process of technical,
19. Id. at 6 6.
20. Id. 116.
21. Articles in the agreement addressed: Furnishing of Technical Assistance; Cooperation of the
Government with Respect to the Provision of Technical Assistance; Administrative and Financial Obligations
of the Parties; Facilities, Privileges and Immunities; Publication of Findings; Modification of Agreement,
Supplemental Agreements and Termination. Id at Annex 1.
22. See discussion of SBAA below.
23. See Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the Second Committee, G.A. Res. 923 (X) (1955);
G.A. Res. 1030 (XI), U.N. GAOR, 537th mtg. (1957).
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economic and social development of the less developed countries, and, in
particular, [...to] facilitate new capital investments of all types - private and
public, national and international - by creating conditions which would make
such investments either feasible or more effective."
24
By its resolution 1219 (XI), and on the basis of the reports prepared by the
Ad hoc Committee on the Question of the Establishment of a Special United
Nations Fund for Economic Development, the General Assembly established
the basic conditions for the establishment of the Special Fund and the terms of
reference of a Preparatory Committee, composed of representatives of sixteen
Governments and appointed by the General Assembly.25
The Special Fund was intended to establish a new administrative and
operational machinery to spearhead the enlargement of the scope of technical
assistance available from the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, to
include such activities as "intensive surveys of water, mineral and potential
power resources, the establishment-including staffing and equipping-of training
institutes in public administration, statistics and technology, and agricultural
and industrial research and productivity centres."'26
The establishment of the Special Fund was accomplished in October 1958,
by General Assembly resolution 1240 (XIII), entitled "Establishment of the
Special Fund." The resolution was adopted on the recommendation of
ECOSOC, which by its resolution 692 (XXVI) if 31 July 1958 had set out the
basic principles and structure of the Fund, following review of the
recommendations of the Preparatory Committee.27
The realization of the Special Fund was a unique accomplishment of the
United Nations in the field of development. Many of the institutions until that
time, such as UNICEF, had been by and large inherited from the League of
Nations and so this was one of the new structures under the Charter of the
United Nations. The Fund was provided a separate inter-governmental
governing body, known as the Governing Council.' The Council was to
exercise inter-governmental control of the policies and operations of the Fund,
with final authority for the approval of the projects and programmes
recommended by the Managing Director. It was to provide "general policy
guidance on the administration and operations of the Special Fund." The
management of the Fund was to be entrusted to a Management Director
appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the Governing
24. See Financing of Economic Development, G.A. Res. 1219 (XIl), U.N. GAOR, 730th mtg.
(1957).
25. G.A. Res. 1219 (XII) was adopted on December 14, 1957.
26. Id. M 1-2.
27. See Id. 12.
28. The Governing Council was transformed into the Executive Board in 1994 as a result of General
Assembly resolution 48/162 dated December 20, 1993.
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Council and subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. The
Management Director was to be advised by a Consultative Board consisting of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Executive Chairman of the
Technical Assistance Board and the President of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development or their designated representatives.29
Immediately following the Governing Council's second session in May of
1959, action was taken towards establishing the legal framework of Special
Fund projects.3 ° The Governing Council prepared standard agreements
designed to govern the relations between the Special Fund on the one hand, and
the recipient governments and executing agencies on the other.3" These
agreements were similar to those used by the Expanded Programme and
embodied the conditions under which the Fund would provide each government
with assistance. The Agreement specified the nature of participation of the
government in the execution of projects, its counterpart contribution (provision
of materials, equipment, supplies, etc.) as well as the provision of local
facilities. The Agreement also dealt with the provision of privileges and
immunities to be accorded to the Special Fund and the executing agencies, their
property, funds and assets, and their personnel.3 2
The Standard Agreement with the Specialized Agencies, the UN or the
IAEA when acting as Executing Agency, known as the Executing Agency
Agreement, specified the respective responsibilities for the execution of
projects and outlined the financial and reporting arrangements.33 Pursuant to
this agreement, the role of the Specialized Agencies under the Special Fund
remained much the same as in the Expanded Programme. The Managing
Director of the Fund was to rely on the assistance of the Specialized Agencies
29. The Consultative Board would seem to be the precursor of the modern day Management
Committee established by the UNDP Executive Board for UNOPS.
30. Implementation of the Programme Approved By the Governing Council at its Second Session,
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. SF/L 22, at 1, 12 (1959).
31. Annual Report ofthe Managing Director ofthe Special Fundfor 1999, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. SF/L.28, at 14 28 (1960). Drafted StandardAgreement with Executing Agency,
U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. SF/L12/Add. 15/Rev. 1 (1959).
32. Id 129. The articles of agreement addressed the following. Assistance to be provided by the
Special Fund, Execution of Projects, Information Concerning Project, Co-operation of Government in
Execution of Project, Local Facilities to be Provided by the Government to the Special Fund and the
Executing Agency. Relation to Assistance from other Sources, Use of Assistance, Facilities- Privileges and
Immunities, Settlements of Disputes, and General Provisions. See, e.g., Draft Standard Agreement with
Governments, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. SFIL12/Add.14/ Rev.1 (1959).
33. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. SF/L28 130 (1959). The agreement included articles on the following:
Performance of Work by Executing Agency, Conclusion of Agreement with Governments, Executing Agency
Status in Carrying out Projects, Information Regarding projects, Cost of Projects, Manner of Payment,
Records-Accounts-Vouchers, Expenses of Preparation, Currency and Rates of Exchange, Revision of
Financial Arrangements, Immunities of Subcontractor, and General Provisions. See, e.g., SFIL. 12/Add.15/
Rev. 1, "Draft Standard Agreement with Executing Agency."
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when evaluating project requests and to use the services available within the
Expanded Programme, moreover such Agencies along with the UN and LAEA
were responsible for the execution of the projects.
In addition to the two aforementioned sets of agreements which constituted
the basic legal framework for co-operation, a Plan of Operation was signed by
the three parties concerned, for each individual project. A typical Plan of
Operation, as a tripartite agreement between the Government, the Special Fund
and the Executing Agency concerned, contained a description of the project, a
detailed work plan for its execution including particulars concerning experts,
fellowships and equipment to be provided, a timetable showing sequence of
operation, and a detailed budget of the costs to be borne by the government and
the Special Fund.' Today, the Plan of Operation is known as the programme
support or project document.
The other salient features of the Fund were that projects were to be
undertaken only at the request of a Government or group of Governments (as
with the Expanded Programme); the execution of projects was to be carried out
by the United Nations, by the Specialized Agencies and the IAEA; and the
Managing Director was authorized to contract services of "other agencies,
private firms or individual experts" where the services of the executing
agencies were "wholly or partly unavailable or inadequate."
C. The Consolidation of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
and the Special Fund into the United Nations Development Programme
UNDP was established by General Assembly resolution 2029(XX) of 22
November 1965 by merging the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance
and the Special Fund, on the understanding that the special characteristics and
operations of the two programmes, as well as two separate funds, were to be
maintained and that contributions would be pledged to the two programmes
separately.35 The justifications for the merger were to, inter alia, streamline the
activities of the two programmes and provide a "more solid basis for the future
growth and evolution" of UN assistance programmes.36
A single inter-governmental committee of thirty-seven members known as
the Governing Council of UNDP was established to perform the functions
previously exercised by the Governing Council of the Special Fund and the
TAC, including the consideration and approval of projects and programmes and
allocation of funds. In addition, the Governing Council was to provide general
policy guidance and direction for the United Nations Development Programme
34. U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 28-29, at 15 131, U.N. Doc. SF/L.28 (1960).
35. G.A. Res.2029, U.N. GAOR, 220th Sess., Supp. Nos. 1,4,6, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/5748 (1965).
36. Id. at pmbl.
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as a whole, as well as for the United Nations regular programmes of technical
assistance.37
In place of the TAB of the Expanded Programme and the Consultative
Board of the Special Fund, an advisory committee known as the Inter-Agency
Consultative Board of UNDP was established. The Board was to meet under
the chairmanship of the Administrator or Co-Administrator and was to include
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the executive heads of the
specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency or their
representatives. The Board was to be consulted on all significant aspects of the
United Nations Development Programme, in particular, on the programmes and
projects submitted by governments prior to their submission to the Governing
Council, the selection of agencies for the execution of specific projects, and the
appointment of the Resident Representative.38
In 1969, a few years following the consolidation of the Expanded
Programme and the Special Fund, the United Nations commissioned a Study on
the Capacity of the United Nations Development System.39 The purpose of the
Study was to assess the capacity of the United Nations system to effectively use
UNDP's resources and its capacity to handle a programme double the
operations at that tine.' The Study critiqued the problems experienced in the
UN development system, in quantitative and qualitative terms, and made
recommendations for the future.
With respect to the qualitative aspects of UN development programmes
relevant to the present paper, the Study pointed out that a donor bias existed
whereby initiative came from specialized agencies and not from the country
itself, that there was a failure to recognize the need for a comprehensive
approach to development problems and insufficient emphasis on training.4' The
Study further noted that development projects resulted from the "salesmanship"
of specialized agencies rather than the priority needs of recipient governments,
that specialized agencies had heavy operational burdens which resulted in
delays in programme delivery as well as a decline in quality.42 Included in the
Study's recommendations to address the problems was the need to broaden the
concept of development to take into account the changing political, economic
and social conditions, noting that international development is made up of
individual national goals and reaffirming the country approach to
37. Id. 4.
38. Id 6.
39. A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System, G.A. Res. 2029, U.N.
GAOR., 20th Sess., Supp. Nos. 1, 4, 6, at 20, U.N. Doc. DP/5 (1969).
40. Id 1.
41. Id. 21.
42. Id 23 (a)-(b).
Ssekandi & Johnson
development. 43  With respect to the specialized agencies, the Study
recommended that, in cases where specialized agencies were over-burdened,
projects should be contracted outside the system, noting that the legislative
authority already existed, whereby the Administrator could specify that an
Agency subcontract on his behalf when assigning a project to it for execution.'
Following the recommendations contained in the Study, the General
Assembly adopted resolution 2688(XXV) of 11 December 1970, which sets out
UNDP's methods of operation, excluding the subsequent changes relating, inter
alia, to national execution discussed below.45 In accordance with this
resolution, distinctions between the Technical Assistance and Special Fund
components have been eliminated.' UNDP was to operate under the "United
Nations Development Co-Operation Cycle, which included the following
phases: country programme formulation, project formulation, appraisal and
approval, implementation, evaluation and follow-up." '47 The Cycle also
included periodic reviews.4
Pursuant to resolution 2688, country programming, the first phase of the
Cycle, is based on individual national development plans, or where they do not
exist, on national development priorities or objectives. The Government of the
country concerned retains the exclusive responsibility for formulating its
national development plan.49 The total resources available for programming is
divided between country programming on the one hand and inter-country
programming (consisting of sub-regional, regional, interregional, and global
projects) on the other."
The implementation of UNDP assistance is overseen by the Governing
Council and the Administrator. The Governing Council is empowered to
approve projects submitted by programmes for consideration. However, the
Governing Council while retaining this authority, delegates to the Administrator
43. Id. 134.
44. G.A. Res. 2029, supra note 39, at 20.
45. Other significant changes since the Consensus relate to the introduction of the programming
approach which seeks to integrate projects into a coordinated programme or programmes within the country
The Program Approach, U.N. Doc.E/199373, Annex I; U.N. Doc. E/ 995/98, 169 and the shift from the
use of the Indicative Planning Figure (IPF) for the allocation of programme resources which was essentially
guaranteed funding for the country programme to TRAC resources which is based on the premise that
governments get only a percentage ofdesignated funding and that the remainder is contingent upon minimum
performance indicators (cite).
46. See G.A. Res. 2029, supra note 39.
47. G.A. Res. 2688, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., annex, 1 1, 2, 4, 7, 11, at 50-59, U.N. Doc.
E/4884/Rev.1 (1970).
48. Id. 1l.
49. d 9 4-5.
50. Id. 24. Recent developments in the area of the country program, country cooperation
framework, program cycle, and program resources can be found.
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for three years the authority to approve projects within country programmes. 5'
The Governing Council has over-all responsibility for ensuring that the
resources of the Programme are employed with maximum efficiency and
effectiveness in assisting the development of the developing countries.52 In
particular, the Council's responsibilities includes: considering and approving
country programmes, approving certain projects included in the programmes,
exercising operational control (including periodic reviews of the country
programmes), and making broad allocations of resources and control their use.53
In addition to the responsibilities delegated to him by the Governing
Council, the Administrator is fully responsible. and accountable to the
Governing Council for all phases and aspects of the implementation of the
Programme. 4 The application of the twin principle of the Administrator's full
accountability for the Programme and the decentralization to the country level
envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2688 required modifications in the
existing structures and procedures of the Programme. At the headquarters level,
regional bureaus were established to provide a direct link between the
Administrator and the resident representative in all matters concerning field
activities.55 In addition, in order to analyze the main trends in the evolution of
the Programme, a small long-term planning staff was established at the
headquarters level under the direction of a senior official.5 6 In addition, at the
country level, the resident representative was re-designated resident director.57
There was the maximum possible delegation of authority to the resident
director; he was to have full over-all responsibility for the programme in the
country concerned.58
Thus, under General Assembly resolution 2688, the role of the specialized
agencies in the provision of development assistance is preserved. The
resolution stipulates that the role of such Agencies is to be that of partners and
their advice available to the Administrator in the implementation of all projects,
whether executed by them or not.59 The resolution further stipulates that such
Agencies shall have first consideration as executing agents for the
implementation of the programme assistance.'
51. Id. 120.
52. G.A. Res. 2688, supra note 50, at 35.
53. Id. 36.
54. Id. 137.
55. Id. 57.
56. Id. 158.
57. G.A. Res. 2688, supra note 50, at 62.
58. Id. 163.
59. Id. 38.
60. Id. 7 39-40.
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Following the consolidation of UNDP, the Administrator commenced
preparation of a new standard agreement with a view to reflecting the "unitary
concept" of UNDP and to incorporating certain provisions from the project
documents in order to simplify negotiations with the recipient countries on such
project documents. 1 Today, over 130 governments have signed the new basic
agreement, referred to as the SBAA. It continues to be the basic agreement
between UNDP and programme country governments that sets out the terms
and conditions of UNDP's support to such countries.
II1. SECTION Two
A. The Transition to Government Execution
Throughout the period up to 1974, development theory, policy and practice
remained largely unchanged. The persistence of under-development was
explained by the lack of technical skills, shortage of managerial capacity and
dearth of capital.6 2 The injection of technical assistance and capital from more
advanced countries was the logical solution.
However, by the Second United Nations Development Decade developing
countries expressed the desire for a new international economic order, in part
a manifestation of the declining validity of the traditional approach to
development. The General Assembly adopted the International Strategy for the
Decade on October 24, 1970, wherein the General Assembly confirmed that the
ultimate objective of development must be to bring about sustained
improvement in the well-being of the individual and bestow benefits on all.63
By 1974, the General Assembly had proclaimed a "New International Economic
Order," declaring that the greatest achievement during the last decades had been
the independence from colonial domination and that the present international
economic order was in direct conflict with developments in international
political and economic relations. 4 The General Assembly further declared that
changes in the international economy necessitated full and equal participation
of developing countries in all decisions concerning the international
community.'
These dramatic changes in the international economic order forced UNDP
to consider new dimensions in technical cooperation. UNDP recognized that
the increased emphasis placed on self-reliance by developing countries required
61. Report of the Administrator on the Standard Agreement With Governments: Note by the
Administrator, G.A. (Res. 2688., U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Item no. 6, U.N. Doc. DP/86, 6 (1974).
62. Harrod/Dumas Growth Model.
63. G.A. Res. 2626, U.N. GAOR, Item no. 42, U.N. Doc. A/81241DS (1970).
64. G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Item no. 7, U.N. Doc. A/9548 (1974).
65. Id. IN 1-3.
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a re-thinking of the automatic dependence on external inputs in technical
assistance." It is against this backdrop that UNDP declared for the first time
that governments and institutions in recipient countries should be increasingly
entrusted with the responsibility for executing UNDP projects.67 This view was
supported by a group of experts selected by the Secretary-General, at the
request of the General Assembly in resolution 3343 (XXIX) of December 17,
1974, to recommend proposals on structural changes within the United Nations
system to ensure that it is fully capable of dealing with problems of
international economic cooperation in a comprehensive manner. In this respect,
the experts recommended that responsibility for execution of projects need not
be automatically assigned to specialized agencies but that it could be entrusted
to, inter alia, "the recipient Government itself; institutions in the recipient
country; appropriate consultants, universities, contracting agencies or firms,
etc., institutions of other developed or developing countries."'
Consistent with UNDP's consideration of new dimensions in technical
cooperation, and the recommendations of the group of experts convened by the
General Assembly, in June and November 1975, the Governing Council and the
General Assembly decided that "Governments and institutions" in programme
countries should be increasingly entrusted with the "responsibility for executing
projects" assisted by UNDP.69 The decision by the Governing Council and the
General Assembly constituted the first major legal step towards government
execution and represents a significant progression from General Assembly
resolution 2688 which gave first consideration for the execution of projects to
organizations of the United Nations system.7'
Shortly after the adoption of resolution 3405 by the General Assembly, the
UNDP Administrator issued guidelines on the execution of UNDP-assisted
projects by governments and institutions of developing countries.7 In the
66. Report oftheAdministrator on the Future Role of UNDP in World Development in the Context
of the Preparations for the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly, U.N. 3AOR., 20th Sess.,
Agenda Item 3 (c), U.N. Doc. UNDP DP/1 14 (1975).
67. ld. 153.
68. Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations System, U.N. GAOR,
1 150, U.N. Doc. EIAC.62/9 (1975).
69. Decision of the Governing Council, G.A. Res. 3405 (XXX), U.N.GAOR, 487th Mtg., Annex
(e)(i,ii,vii) (1975).
70. G.A. Res. 2688, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., annex IX, at 1 40, 50, U.N. Doc. E/5703 (1975).
Under resolution 2688, however, the Administrator was authorized to make use of "suitable services" from
governmental and non-governmental institutions and firms, through competitive bidding. The provision of
such services would be on the basis of a contract and are, thus, distinguished from execution which implied
a larger role in the management of the project.
71. Guidelines on the Execution of UNDP Assisted Projects by Governments and Institution of
Developing Countries, UNDP, U.N. Doc. UNDP/Prog/51 (1976); U.N. Doc. UNDP/Prog/field/72;
UNDP/Prog/Hqtrs/91 (1976) [hereinafter Guidelines].
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introduction to the guidelines, the Administrator explained that government
execution would constitute "an important aspect of the move towards
decentralization, and a means of economizing on overheads, enhancing the
capabilities of local expertise and institutions, and thereby promoting self-
reliance." 2 The Administrator further explained that government execution
would strengthen the "indispensable role" of governments in their development,
diversify the supply base for UNDP and facilitate the delivery of an expanding
programme.73 In accordance with the guidelines, governments were to
nominate themselves or other national agencies, organizations or institutions as
the "Government Executing Agency" with full responsibility for the
preparation, implementation and follow-up of a project assisted by UNDP.74
Thus, the new partnership with governments under this modality was to be that
of a bipartite relationship between UNDP and the government.75
Upon request of a government to execute a project, U.NDP would carry out
an assessment of the government's capacity to determine whether the proposed
government executing agency had sufficient managerial and technical capability
to fulfill its obligations as executing agency. In order to assess capacity,
Governments were requested to provide information on:
(a) the experience of the institution in executing similar projects,
whether financed from domestic or external sources;
(b) the depth of technical experience and know-how of the
institution and its access to, and links with, national and international
sources of expertise and know-how;
(c) the ability of the institution to exercise adequate managerial and
administrative supervision over the project; and
(d) the internal budgetary, accounting and audit arrangements of the
institution... [as well as] a copy of the financial rules and regulations
of the institution.76
When UNDP determined that the government executing agency had
sufficient capacity to execute the project, under the government execution
guidelines, that entity would be responsible for carrying out the project as it
would if it were a government project. Thus, the government executing agency
would be responsible for the engagement of international and national project
staff, who were responsible to the Government; the procurement, transport and
installation of equipment under the rules and procedures of the government;
72. Id. at 1.
73. Id.
74. I at 3.
75. Id. at2.
76. Guidelines, supra note 71.
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awarding of sub-contracts, which would be entered into directly between the
government and sub-contractor; and placement of fellows in training
institutions and carrying out other training activities."
Although government execution was largely a bilateral arrangement
between INDP and the government, provision was made for the involvement
of specialized agencies and other agencies of the UN system in all stages of the
project cycle. However, the involvement of such agencies was subject to the
specific request of the government and their role under government-executed
projects was limited to providing technical and substantive backstopping and
not the direct delivery of inputs, such as procurement.78
Following the issuance of the guidelines for execution of projects by
governments and institutions, on July 2, 1976, the Governing Council began to
restrict the Administrator's use of government execution by only authorizing
him to initiate government execution projects on a "carefully selected basis
pending submission of a detailed report to the Council ... on the criteria,
evaluation and administrative procedures and changes in the financial rules
necessary for the implementation of that new dimension on a regular basis."'7 9
Thus, although the guidelines on government execution were issued in May of
1976 to field offices and participating/executing agencies, just two months
following their issuance, the Governing Council in its decision 76/57 appeared
to slow down the move towards government execution.
In 1978, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) prepared a report on the Role of
Experts in Development Cooperation."° The 1978 Report included an
assessment of the government execution modality. In particular, the Report
noted that implementation problems arise in projects when there is a "failure to
recognize government responsibility at the project identification and
formulation stages."'" The inspectors found that Governments which were not
involved at the early stages of project formulation felt that the project activities
did not relate to what they actually wanted and, consequently, expressed little
sense of commitment towards the project.82 The JIU recommended a "fresh
77. ILd. 23.
78. Id. It 49-51.
79. Governing Council decision 76/57, 1 (e) (1976).
80. Report on the Role of Experts in Development Co-Operation, UNDP, at 47.1, U.N. Doc.
JIU/REPf78/3 (1978). [hereinafter Experts]. In accordance with the Statute of the Joint Inspection Unit
(JIU), approved by the General Assembly in resolution 31/192 of 22 December 1976, the JIU consists of not
more than 11 inspectors chosen among members of national supervision or inspection bodies who serve in
their personal capacity. The JIU is charged with the responsibility of investigating all matters bearing on the
efficiency of the services and proper use of funds, including evaluation of programmes and activities. The
inspectors may propose reforms or make recommendations which are contained in reports drawn up under
their signature.
81. IL 144.
82. Id.
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approach" to government execution where each new project supported by
UNDP would be under "full government management."83  Under the JIU
proposal, although the government management authority would be exercised
over all aspects of project implementation, the government could seek the
cooperation of one or more of the agencies of the United Nations system in any
aspect of project preparation or implementation, such as recruitment and
procurement of international project components.8
In preparing the Report, the IU sent questionnaires to governments,
UNDP resident representatives and agencies to elicit views on the applicability
and feasibility of government execution. An analysis of the responses showed
that 4/5 of the 72 responding governments felt that government execution was
appropriate for use in their countries, with half giving it a high priority
ranking. 5 Resident Representatives and Agencies took a more conservative
position than governments in assessing the suitability of government
execution," The JIU further found that many governments had gained
experience in recruitment and procurement through implementation of their
own development programmes and established systematized procedures and
machinery for these purposes.8 The JIU concluded, as follows:
Government project management is an essential step in the direction
of self-reliant development, and it is equally imperative in order to
clear up the existing uncertainty as to where the management
authority for UNDP-assisted projects really lies. The present system
not only divides responsibility and authority - thus contradicting one
of the fundamental principles of good management by setting up dual
chains of command - but it does so in a way which places actual
decision-making powers in large measure beyond the reach of
national authorities, who are nevertheless most vitally concerned. By
the same token, the present system partly diverts the Agencies of the
United Nations system from their proper preoccupation with the
transmission of technical knowledge and skills, by involving them in
numerous management and administrative tasks which should not be
their primary concern. For all these reasons, the present system
contributes to difficulties in project identification, planning and
implementation in which there is insufficient government
participation, and hence leads to large, if as yet unquantified, wastage
in the use of both national and international resources. By accepting
government management as standard procedures for the UNDP
83. Id. 145.
84. Id.
85. Experts, supra note 80.
86. Id. at48.
87. d at 52.
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programme, an energetic start can be made towards rectifying this
situation and reducing the inefficiencies and diseconomies which
characterize it.88
The response of UNDP and the UN Agencies to the JIU Report was one
of caution. In joint comments prepared by UNDP and the UN Agencies, they
indicated that the proposals made by the JIU required the "most careful
assessment" by the Council. 89
Following the JIU report, new guidelines on government execution were
issued on January 18, 1979.9 The major difference in the 1979 procedures as
compared to the 1976 procedures is the prominence of the role of the UN
agencies. The 1976 procedures indicated that under government execution
UNDP and the government would essentially have a bilateral relationship, with
UN agencies providing technical support at the specific request of the
government. In the 1979 procedures, however, the close association of the UN
agencies with UNDP using the government execution modality is affirmed, as
follows:
[Government execution] calls for constant awareness on the part of
UNDP and Agencies of Governments' primary responsibility for all
management aspects of projects, and careful judgement in each case
of how to derive the greatest benefit from the technical experience
and knowledge available with the organizations of the United Nations
system. The interdependence of UNDP and the Agencies in their
support of countries' development efforts and UNDP's reliance on
Agencies' technical judgement in the planning and implementation of
projects and in the assessment of their results call for constant and
close cooperation in all aspects of government execution.9'
Consistent with the maintenance of the role of the UN agencies under
government execution, the 1979 procedures introduced the term "Cooperating
Agency" whereby a UN agency could participate in project execution along
with the Government agency concerned, to assist the government in the
utilization of UNDP-fmanced inputs.' In addition, in Annex 1 to the
procedures, government execution is defined as an "arrangement whereby
88. Id. 154.
89. Joint Comments of UNDP and the Organizations of the United Nations System on JJU's Report
on the Role of Experts in Development Assistance, UNDP, 25th Sess., Supp. nos. 16, 18, 20, U.N. Doc.
DP/334/Add.2 (1978).
90. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. UNDP/Prog/64; UNDP/Prog/HQTRS/116; UNDP/Prog/ Field/101
(1974).
91. Id. 12.
92. Id. 143.
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UNDP entrusts to a government the responsibility for the mobilization of
UNDP-financed inputs and their effective application, in combination with the
government's own and other available resources, towards the project's
objectives. '"" In hccordance with the 1979 procedures, governments were
invited to designate one central authority to represent the government in dealing
with UNDP, however, the central authority did not have to be the same entity
actually carrying out project activities.'
In his report to the Governing Council in DP/558 of March 12, 1981, the
Administrator proposed a reversal of the cautious and selective approach to
implementing government execution previously adopted by the Governing
Council. While the debate on the Report reflected a range of views, with some
member states fully endorsing the approach and others arguing for a
continuation of the cautious approach, the Governing Council requested, in its
decision 81/21, that the Administrator give "full consideration" to
implementation of UNDP assistance by the host governments and that the
Administrator, along with representatives of the UN agencies, should review
and analyze in greater detail the reasons for the lack of progress in
implementing government execution.95
In response to decision 81/21, the Administrator submitted a report to the
Governing Council wherein he stated that the experience with government
execution had generally been positive, with a "slow but steady" progress in its
use." Findings contained in the report indicated that most governments felt
that, through government execution, they were closer to realizing self-reliance
in their development efforts. Others felt that through assuming full
responsibility in project design and implementation, the projects would be more
likely to "respond to specific requirements determined by local norms, values
and conditions. 97 However, the Report also noted that some governments
preferred the traditional modality of providing assistance through the use of the
UN agencies.98 The Report concluded that while many governments saw the
concept of government execution in a favourable light, they did not see
immediate large-scale implementation of government execution."
93. Id. Annex 1 7.
94. Id. Annex 19.
95. Governing Council Decision, U.N. GAOR, 734th mtg., U.N. Doc. 81/21. (1981).
96. Report ofthe Administrator Government Execution, UNDP, 29th Sess. U.N. Doc. DP/1982/11
8 (1982). For example, in 1976, two projects were under government execution for a total UNDP
contribution of US $1,630,230; by 1981, forty projects were under government execution for a total
contribution of US $12,298,538 See, e.g. DP/1982/11 /Add.11 1982, 1 13.
97. Id. 113; (See e.g. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. DP/19821 I/Add. II, T 13. (1982).
98. Id. 17.
99. Id. ( 20-21.
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In April of 1987, the Administrator again reviewed the impact of
government execution."°  In his report to the Governing Council, the
Administrator noted that since its inception, government execution had grown
in importance and complexity. By the end of 1986, some 600 projects had been
executed by governments for a total of US $150 million."0 ' The Asia and
Pacific region utilized the government execution modality more than any other
region, with China executing the highest number (40) of projects. 2 At the end
of 1986, the four sectors with the largest number of government executed
projects were general development issues, policy and planning; agriculture,
forestry and fisheries; natural resources; and industry. 'I
With respect to the impact of government execution, the Administrator
indicated that an evaluation exercise was underway to make detailed
assessments of the successes and failures of government execution. The
Administrator further explained that preliminary replies from Resident
Representatives indicated that a high proportion of the government executed
projects appeared successful. 4 However, the Administrator pointed out that
some problems had been experienced with government execution, including
low rates of delivery.0 5 The reasons for the low delivery were being
investigated but it appeared that it was related to delays in recruiting experts
and slow reporting." 6 In addition, the Administrator indicated that cost-
effectiveness was to be measured by the evaluation exercise underway. It was
noted in this respect that the UNDP field offices and headquarters had
expended considerable resources in supporting government execution, largely
in the area of administrative and financial/accounting support. The reason for
this was not the inability of governments to carry out administrative, financial
and accounting procedures but was due to the difficulty in getting governments
to comply with extraneous administrative and accounting procedures for
projects which were considered relatively small in relation to governmental
budgets. 7 The Administrator concluded that the general assessment of
government execution was that much progress had been made.0 8 The detailed
100. Report of the Administrator: Government execution, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. DP/1987/16
(1987). [hereinafter Administrator].
101. Id. 45.
102. Id. 46-47.
103. Id. 48.
104. Id 52.
105. For example, in 1981, the total programme delivery rate was 77.6%, but only 61.6% for
government executed projects; in 1985, the total programme delivery rate was 69.1%, but only 50.1% for
government executed projects. Administrator, supra note 100, at 157.
106. 1 58.
107. Id. 63, 68.
108. ld 9[79.
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evaluation was submitted to the Governing Council on 4 March 1988."° The
response of the Governing Council was positive, with the Council, in its
decision 88/18, encouraging Governments to "continue the expansion of
government execution."'110
By 1989, it was felt by UNDP that a new agreement was needed with
governments entrusted with the execution of UNDP projects. The SBAA was
prepared on the basis of the tripartite approach, whereby UNDP executing
agencies would carry out the project activities. As such, the SBAA did not
envision execution by governments. Thus, in order to set out the legal
framework of government execution, the roles and responsibilities of the
parties, and to address certain problems that had arisen in the past with respect
to government execution relating, inter alia, to the lack of a central
coordinating authority representing the government and to the increased
involvement of field offices in carrying out project activities on behalf of
governments, a new Government Execution Agreement was prepared."I
Pursuant to that agreement, a central governmental authority would be charged
to coordinate the projects executed by the Government and to select the entity
to carry out the actual execution of the project. In cases where the Government
could not perform the full range of activities, provision was made for a UNDP
Executing Agency to act as a cooperating agency to assist the Government in
carrying out project activities. Finally, the agreement charged the Government
to be accountable to the Administrator for the proper utilization of the project
funds and implementation of project activities. Thus, the Governments were
to submit audited financial reports and accurate technical progress reports.
Unfortunately, for reasons that are not entirely clear, this agreement was never
used by UNDP. The government execution arrangements continued to be
carried out under the SBAA, with modest adjustments to the project document
to address some of the new financial and administrative details required under
government execution."'
109. Governing Council, UNDP, 36th Sess., at 57, U.N. Doc. DP/1988/19/A.2 (1988).
110. Governing Council Decision, UNDP, 35th Sess. '11, at 56, Doc. DP/1988/12/A..2 (1988).
111. Memorandum from Mr. Francis Ssekandi, Deputy Director, General Legal Division, to Mr.
Douglas Stafford, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Finance and Administration, UNDP, dated
October 26, 1989.
112. There may have been concern that governments would not sign the new agreement and that it
would be easier to continue using the SBAA, with the modifications on the project document. In this respect,
three annexes were developed to attach to the project documents to address the new financial and
administrative arrangements under government execution. See, e.g., UNDP PPM, Section 3490 et al on
Government Execution.
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B. National Execution
By 1990, the term "government execution" was replaced with "national
execution" to better reflect the variety of ways in which projects are
implemented. 3 At the same time, UNDP began referring to national execution
as the "ultimate modality" for activities supported by UNDP." 4 UNDP defined
national execution, as follows:
National execution is a cooperative operational arrangement whereby
the Government assumes responsibility for the effective management
of all aspects of its UNDP-financed technical assistance projects and
programmes as requested by it and agreed to by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP). National execution recognizes
the wide range of technical support possibilities, and encourages
implementation arrangements that draw upon outside technical
expertise and in particular, the specialized agencies of the United
Nations. Under national execution, Governments are responsible for
the conduct of all project and programme activities including those
implemented by the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the
Office of Personnel Services (OPS) of UNDP, or other organizations
or institutions on their behalf. Governments are accountable to the
Administrator of UNDP for ensuring the most appropriate
implementation arrangements, the quality of technical cooperation
funded by UNDP and its judicious financial management." 5
With respect to the role of the specialized agencies in national execution,
UNDP saw the effective use and association of the specialized agencies as a
major challenge." 6 In this respect, the Administrator pointed out in its report
to the Governing Council that the specialized agencies had been used only to
a very limited extent in national execution. One reason for this trend suggested
by the Administrator is the appearance of new implementation agents on the
international development scene - non governmental organizations, private
sector firms and national institutions." 7  Notwithstanding the limited
involvement of specialized agencies and the appearance of new actors in the
113. Report of the Administrator, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. DP/1990/33 7 (1990).
114. Id. 3.
115. Id 8. The Governing Council of UNDP took note of the Administrator's report containing
the proposed definition of national execution (Governing Council decision 90/21 1 (1990).
116. Report of the Administrator to the Governing Council, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. DP/1991/23
136. (1991).
117. Id. 37.
Ssekandi & Johnson
development area, the Administrator concluded that there is still a "significant
continuing role for United Nations specialized agencies.".. 8
At the request of the Governing Council, UNDP issued guidelines for field
offices on national execution in 1992, which defined key terminology such as
execution and implementation and the roles of the Government, specialized
agencies and UNDP in national execution. However, in 1993, the General
Assembly, in resolution 47/199, while affirming that national execution should
be the "norm for programmes and projects supported by the UN system, taking
into account the needs and capacities of recipient countries," again requested
that the United Nations development system agree on a common interpretation
of national execution. Thus, the Consultative Committee on Programme and
Operational Questions (CCPOQ), under the authority of the Secretary-General,
agreed that national execution is a "cooperative operational arrangement
entailing, inter alia, overall responsibility for the formulation and management
of programmes and projects by the recipient country, as well as the recipient
country's assumption of accountability for them."" 9 The CCPOQ also agreed
on the objectives and guiding principles for national execution, including, inter
alia, the recognition of the central role, ownership, direction and control of the
Government, and the enhancement of capacity building, self-reliance and
sustainability."2
Thus, by 1993, after almost 20 years since the first legislation on
government execution, the General Assembly had endorsed national execution
as the norm for the provision of development assistance by the United Nations
development system, with UNDP at the center of that system. Through this
progression to national execution, UNDP attempted to adapt itself to respond
to the needs of programme country governments and their desire to be in charge
of their national development programmes. UNDP's willingness to make
national execution the norm was a recognition of the fact that empowerment of
and control by national governments was the only way to lead to real impact
and results.
IV. SECTION THREE
A. Initial Assessment of National Execution
In 1995, a team of experts carried out an independent evaluation of
national execution, publishing an abridged and edited by UNDP under the title
118. Id.
119. National Execution and Implementation Arrangements, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. E/1993f73,
Annex 4, at 44 (1993).
120. Id.
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"National Execution: Promise and Challenges." '' The evaluation is based on
a field study of 11 countries, Chile, China, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Malawi, Nicaragua, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Zimbabwe.
The study noted that 75% of all UNDP projects were carried out through
national execution. 2 The evaluators found that national execution had both
positive and negative attributes. On the positive side, national execution 1)
improved and expanded the sense of ownership of programmes; 2) increased
self-reliance; 3) contributed to capacity building; and 4) increased cost-
effectiveness. On the negative side, national execution has led to 1) delays in
implementation due to the participatory nature of the modality; and 2) weak
public sector institutions have necessitated short-term compromises such as
national execution support units and parallel salary scales which jeopardize the
long-term objective of institutional capacity building. In this respect, the study
noted that in Latin America, national execution was used to bypass normal
government institutions to ensure that programme activities are completed on
time and to ensure that the funds are properly utilized.
The study was inconclusive on the cost-effectiveness of national
execution. An analysis of project budgets showed a modest decline in the
number of work months assigned to international personnel, with a large
increase in work months delivered by national personnel.124 However, evidence
did not show that greater use of national personnel affected performance, either
positively or negatively. Moreover, a full analysis of cost-effectiveness would
have to take into account costs related to the increased workload of UNDP
country offices.
The study was inconclusive on whether national execution led to increased
sustainability of programmes and projects. The evaluators noted that national
execution should lead to increased sustainability because the programmes are
more fully integrated into national structures, the greater use of national
personnel reduces technical discontinuity at the completion of projects, and the
sense of ownership enhances the possibility that governments will continue
supporting project activities in the future."n
The evaluators noted that the tripartite relationship among UNDP,
governments and specialized agencies no longer applies in its traditional form
as governments increasingly assume functions relating to ownership, oversight,
execution and implementation while the role of the specialized agencies is to
provide technical support. Thus, the evaluators recommended the adoption of
121. The team consisted of the following experts: Mr. Fuat Andic, Richard Huntington, and Ralf
Maurer with support from Mr. Abdenour Benbouali.
122. NATIONAL EXECUTION: PROMISES AND CHALLENGES, 7 (Z. Jamal ed., 1995).
123. l at 24.
124. Id at 25.
125. Id. at 27-28.
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a new conceptual framework for national execution with more clearly defined
roles for UNDP, Government, and Specialized Agencies. The new model
suggested by the evaluators envisages UNDP and Government as partners who
would select a management team which would normally be a national entity but
could be a specialized agency if agreed by the partners that using such an
agency was the optimal way to proceed.
126
In addition to the 1995 evaluation, national execution has been regularly
reviewed internally by the Board of Auditors. Recommendations of the Board
of Auditors on the 1994-95 biennium included that UNDP should re-emphasize
the need to assess the Government's capacity to undertake national execution;
the objectives of national execution should be clearly defined to provide closer
link to UNDP's aims; and that UNDP should issue new guidance on national
execution to reflect all relevant legislation.
2 7
In order to address some of the issues raised in the 1995 evaluation of
national execution and periodic comments of the Board of Auditors, UNDP
revised the procedures for national execution which were finalized following
guidance from the UNDP Executive Board in 1998. The procedures define
national execution, consistent with the definition used by the CCPOQ in 1993,
as a "cooperative operational arrangement entailing, among other things, overall
responsibility and assumption of accountability of the formulation and
management by the programme country of UNDP supported programmes and
projects." The key principles of national execution are the use of government
rules and procedures where they are consistent with internationally recognized
practices, government accountability for effective use of UNDP resources and
adherence to UNDP rules and regulations when the UNDP country office
provides services.
The procedures stipulate that national execution is based on an expression
of government's interest and willingness to assume management responsibilities
for the programme or project as well as national capacities. The procedures set
out key considerations for execution to guide country offices in determining
where national capacities need to be strengthened. Such considerations fall
within the areas of technical, managerial, administrative and financial capacity
of the national entity.
The procedures describe the roles of the various actors in nationally-
executed programmes and projects. The Government Coordinating Authority,
the focal point for all communications with UNDP, assumes ultimate
responsibility for the overall management of the programme or project on
behalf of the Government. The Government Coordinating Authority in
126. Id. at 9.
127. Report of the Board of Auditors, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 5A, U.N. Doc.
A/51/5/Add.1 (1995).
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consultation with UNDP designates the national entity which will serve as the
executing agent primarily responsible for the planning and overall management
of programme and project activities, reporting, accounting, monitoring and
evaluation, and audit. The executing agent can be a Ministry, a department
within a ministry; any other national entity, such as a central bank, a university,
regional and local authorities and municipalities. The implementing agent,
which provides services or carries out activities under the supervision of the
executing agent, including procurement activities, can be the executing agent
itself, another government entity, a United Nations executing agency (i.e. a
specialized agency or other UN entities authorized to execute projects) or an
outside entity such as an NGO, a private company, a consulting firm or a
university. In addition to acting in the capacity of an implementing agent, the
procedures specify that UN agencies can provide support to policy and
programme development (policy for the formulation of strategies and
programmes, advisory services and sectoral advice, technical assistance needs
assessment, sectoral or multi-disciplinary studies) as well as technical support
at all stages of the programme or project cycle (formulation and appraisal,
technical support and monitoring of activities during implementation,
evaluation).
The procedures provide that in addition to the assistance that UNDP
normally provides to UNDP-supported programmes and projects, the UNDP
country office may provide further support to the executing and implementing
agents including assistance with UNDP reporting requirements and making
direct payments.
One of the most important sections of the new procedures deals with the
provision of support services, including recruitment of personnel, facilitation
of training activities, procurement of goods and services, by the country office.
UNDP sought confirmation of its mandate from the Executive Board to provide
such services, which some delegations argued were tantamount to direct
execution, outside UNDP's mandate. In a hotly debated session of the
Executive Board in January 1998, the Executive Board reaffirmed UNDP's
mandate to provide support services under the following conditions, which are
reflected in the national execution procedures: the services can only be
provided at the request of the Government and for activities within the country
cooperation framework; the services must be in support of the implementation
of activities described in the annex to the programme support or project
document; the support must be provided based on a capacity assessment and be
accompanied by capacity building measures including an exit strategy to ensure
that long-term capacity building objectives are notjeopardized; and the nature
of the support will take into account services which can be provided by other
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UN agencies.128 In order to placate those delegations which were concerned
that country office support services were in fact direct execution, namely
Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland (only an observer), the Executive
Board also specified that direct execution activities of UNDP should be limited
to countries in special circumstances and apply only when it is "essential to
safeguard the full responsibility and accountability of the Administrator for the
effective programme and project delivery."' 29
The procedures also stipulate that the costs of providing such services by
the country office must be detailed in the annex to the programme support or
project document and recovered by UNDP.
In addition to direct country office support, the procedures describe
support services provided by management support units, which carry out
administrative work such as procurement, payment, contracting as well as
reporting, programme management training and capacity building activities.
The procedures stipulate that such units can only be supported or funded by
UNDP when UNDP has assessed sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and capacity
building. Clear responsibilities must be assigned to the unit and described in
the programme support or project document. The support provided by such
units is supposed to be temporary, clearly defined and accompanied by capacity
building measures. The unit is supposed to function within a government
structure and under government supervision. Finally, UNDP cannot employ or
remunerate civil servants working within such a unit and such units cannot be
established with the UNDP country office.
The procedures also give detailed guidance on monitoring and evaluation,
financial management and reporting and audit requirements.
With respect to the legal framework for national execution, UNDP has not
pursued the conclusion of the government execution agreement prepared in
1989. Instead, the national execution procedures provide for the conclusion of
a letter agreement with governments to address the support services provided
by UNDP field offices. The agreement extends the privileges and immunities
accorded to UNDP under the SBAA to the support services provided by UNDP
field offices under national execution. Thus, the SBAA continues to set out the
basic conditions of UNDP's support to programme country governments.
Under that overall agreement, the details concerning national execution are
reflected in annexes to the project documents and in the letter agreements on
support services provided by the UNDP field offices.
128. U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. U.N. Doc. DP/1998/2, dec. 98/2 (1998).
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B. The Future Direction of UNDP and National Execution
After 23 years, national execution is now legally and actually the preferred
modality for the execution of UNDP programmes and projects. During the 23
years leading up to the 1998 national execution procedures, the tension between
giving responsibility to the Governments and taking such responsibility away
from specialized agencies is evident. Clearly, the donors and member states of
such agencies have been aware of the impact that national execution would
have on the involvement of such agencies in UNDP programmes and
projects-that the role of specialized agencies would be marginalized and their
use in such programmes and projects reduced.
What has also become clear in the transition to national execution is that
as the role of the specialized agencies has become less significant, the role of
the UNDP country office has become more prominent. With the 1998 decision
of the UNDP Executive Board, the country office role in providing support
services has been reaffirmed. These activities, which include procurement and
recruitment, are activities formally provided by specialized agencies. Under
national execution, these activities should in principle be carried out by the
national entities responsible for the programmes and projects. Thus, the role
of the country office in national execution will have to be monitored carefully
to ensure that governments are empowered to manage and carry out all aspects
of the programmes and projects, including the procurement and recruitment
activities. The true challenge to UNDP, if it is sincerely committed to the
capacity building of national institutions and the development of programme
countries is not to allow national execution to become in effect direct execution
by the UNDP country office. There is already evidence of UNDP country
offices assuming far too large a role in national execution, notably in Latin
America. Thus, the international community, donor and programme countries
will have to watch and see if UNDP stays true to its mandate, in the hope that
UNDP will meet one of its biggest challenges of the twenty-first century.
